At the end of the 1990s Spain achieved the dream of becoming a "normal" state, as I said in my previous article. The "model" political transition, the Spanish economic "miracle", the accession to the European institutions, the internationalization of its businesses, the expansion of the Spanish language around the world, the Spanish presence at high levels of European community organizations, etc., were winning cards that contributed to creating the story of a democratic, decentralized, dynamic, prosperous, orthodox, serious and European country. Historians, political scientists, diplomats, and even bankers like Mario Conde travelled around the world lecturing on and explaining the keys to the success of the Spanish model of the Transition.
Things started to change in Spain during Aznar's second term (2000-2004), when he obtained an absolute majority. There is a section on hubris (pride, arrogance, megalomania) applied to political leadership that fits the character to a T. The year 2002 was truly spectacular. Aznar created FAES, his think tank; under the Spanish presidency of the EU he decided to side with the USA; he "re-conquered" the islet of Perejil militarily; he pompously celebrated his daughter's wedding in the El Escorial monastery with 1,100 guests; and that same year The Prestige sank. In March of 2003, in the Azores, Aznar himself decided, without consulting with any of his ministers, to support President Bush in the military invasion of Iraq. In 2004, the year of the Atocha station bombing, Spain still maintained a relevant international presence with the appointment of Rodrigo Rato as managing director of the IMF, though he would resign suddenly in 2007 to go to Bankia. The abandonment of European politics by Solana in 2009 was the definitive swan song of Spain's international presence, much like its declining influence in the summits of the Ibero-American General Secretariat.
The years of Zapatero and his plural Spain are known and remembered. The years leading to 2007 were politically and economically stable. The disasters came after that: the collapse of the financial sector, the burst of the real estate bubble, the economic recession, the loss of jobs and soaring unemployment, the fall of the stock market, the bubble in renewable energies, the bubble in unnecessary infrastructures, the European bailout ... From September of 2008, media such as the Financial Times, Newsweek, and The Times began to use the acronym PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) to refer to the countries, like Spain, characterized by the contraction of their economies, high internal and external indebtedness, and serious financial problems. In 2009, Jack Trout, owner of the consultancy Trout and Partners, stated that "Spain no longer sells as a brand in the world", and The Economist and Foreign Policy illustrated the Spanish depression on their covers with the silhouette of a beaten bull and the expression S(pain), or the slogan "Is the Spanish brand a toxic asset?". Finally, in 2011 the social effects of the crisis and especially the scandals over preferred stock and corruption (Bárcenas, Nóos, Gürtel...) generated an unprecedented citizen mobilization of condemnation and outrage (the 15-M movement). And thus we get to the present day when, according to the CIS, all of Rajoy's ministers have dismal approval ratings and, according to the Real Instituto Elcano, Spain is the country with the lowest opinion of itself (54.8 over 100) among the world's advanced countries, followed by Argentina and Italy.
It was necessary to recap all this in order to fully understand the present moment and to justify this thesis: today Spain is a country without a national vision. There is not one shared project for life that is capable of bringing together and inspiring the majority of its citizens. All of its central institutions, from the monarchy to the judiciary, are sinking. The old pessimism of 1889 is back. There is no economic model to replace TB (tourism and bricks), there is no courage, will or capacity to propose a new political or territorial model, nor an ethical and social model for regeneration. There is no collective trust nor is there an integrative cultural model that recognizes differences and national plurality. Better not even to talk about the models for education and research. Today Spain does not have a cosmetic problem (bodywork and paint) but, rather, a problem that requires a full refurbish (engine overhaul and new chassis, drivers, passengers and direction).
For the Spanish there is no national project. For many Catalans the project with Spain is broken and what is needed is to create their own. Spain is now a state without a national vision, while Catalonia is seen as an emerging nation in the process of creating its own. The effects of the crisis are the same for everyone, but the longing and excitement for a new collective project has revived a part of the Catalan citizenry. Presently, engineers, economists, educators, jurists, political scientists, businessmen, experts in public administration, technicians and professionals of all types are carrying out frenetic activity to help design the future foundations of this new state. All the energy, pedagogy, hope, goodwill and professionalism that for three centuries were devoted to the improvement of Spain are now focused on a new dream, a new cause, the Catalan dream. In one case there is emptiness and a loss of self-esteem. In the other, the new energy of someone who is not afraid to think like a state, act like a state and wants to be treated like a new state. It could be the first serious crisis since the Transition in which the Catalans prefer not to intervene nor commit themselves to a profound reformation of the Spanish state. To put it another way, perhaps for the first time the Spanish people will have to resolve their own problems and fight their ghosts without a Catalan contribution. There is no guarantee that the Catalan dream will not fade away, of course. But in times like these, who gives guarantees?
