Although the Spanish monarchy has long suffered from a serious institutional crisis of legitimacy, the recent European elections have probably precipitated the decision of King Juan Carlos to abdicate in favor of his son Felipe. The two parties that have shared power in Spain since the Transition and that have been guarantors of the current constitutional system received barely half of the total votes. Catalan nationalism, which has always been the spearhead of the major historical transformations that Spain has lived (and suffered), has emerged stronger than ever, and with a plan for independence that calls into question, in a radical yet peaceful way, the existing political order.
We don't know whether, in addition to the personal difficulties of the monarch and the uncertainties generated by the economy and the poor Spanish government, the abdication was prepared in order to resolve the Catalan problem. But we do believe that the abdication of Juan Carlos will open a debate over the configuration of the State, and especially over the political process begun in Catalonia. We suspect that the voices in favor of dialogue that continue to be heard abroad and from influential sectors of the economic world will use this inevitable act of generational relief, which in other more normal countries would be pure formality, to open the door to some kind of transformation in the model of the State.
It is not bad that things are finally moving, and moving in the direction of change. A change that is surely being celebrated by supporters of an unspecified third way, or by those who are simply in a hurry for an opportunity to break out of the cul-de-sac in which both the government and the opposition in Madrid had gotten themselves. Today it seems that they want to open an in-depth process of transformation, including a revision of the Constitution that only a week ago was unthinkable.
In Catalonia, where we should flee from ideological positions on the legitimacy or desirability of the monarchical system, it would be a mistake to refuse to listen to the proposals of the other side, if they finally come. But it would also be a mistake to agree, as happened during the Transition and with the Statute of 2005, to negotiate from the simple promise to initiate a process without a defined end and without guarantees of compliance, and with the Spanish state as the only arbiter.
The majority opinion of Catalans regarding a future relationship with the Spanish State has come to a point where it is legitimate to propose certain conditions before sitting down to talk with Spain. There are two principles on which any future negotiations with the State will have to be based.
The first is bilateralism, or the commitment of the representatives of the State to stop thinking of Catalonia as a simple province -one part of an unquestionable whole-. This would mean recognizing Catalonia as an independent entity, with the obligation to negotiate with its representatives on equal terms. The disappointing result of the application of the 1978 Constitution, the fiasco of the Statute of 2005 in the Spanish parliament, the hostility of Spain's public opinion, and the erosion of devolved powers by the Constitutional Court are a direct consequence of the status of permanent minority that Catalonia has within the Spanish public order. Catalonia never has any guarantee that the State will fulfill its promises (when, now and then, it makes any), and cannot count on any neutral institution to force Madrid to comply with the negotiated pacts. This situation will only be resolved when Catalonia and Spain become equal political partners.
From a practical point of view, the minimum result that one could hope for from a process framed in these terms, independently of its formal aspect, would be a complete shielding of the powers (in key areas from finances to language) assumed by the Catalan government, with mechanisms that would guarantee that the minority partner would maintain control over its own affairs or, to put it another way, where the majority partner would no longer be able to systematically impose its will.
The second principle would be that of democratic control, according to which the Catalan people would have the final word on everything agreed with the State. This right to decide its own collective future is, in fact, what the Catalans hope to exercise in the consultation to be held in November, which -let's not forget- includes both the option of full independence and that of free association with Spain.
These two principles bring with them in practice the recognition of Catalonia as a nation, a fact that Spain has always refused to accept. It would require, therefore, an especially difficult paradigm shift, insofar as it would mean the definitive renunciation of the image that Spain has always had of itself. That is to say, a second Transition, perhaps more difficult than the first, because now its not about a change of regime, but rather a change of mentality.
Jaume C. Major of Col·lectiu Emma co-authored this article.
