In the last three hundred years monarchies have had to change to remain in the institutional system of the European nations. In the 18th century, absolute monarchs and the court's officials were at the top of the executive, legislative and judiciary functions. In the 19th century this situation evolved progressively into constitutional monarchies. In this period, kings still held on to significant powers, such as heading and directing the government, appointing members of parliament, etc. Eventually, in the 20th and 21st centuries, parliamentary monarchs ceased to have any explicit capacity with regard to the three classic powers and, basically, their role was limited to symbolic and mediating functions. That is the price they had to pay in order to live on as part of the constitutional weave of liberal democracies.
In the case of Spain, the monarchy's continuity was interrupted by General Franco's dictatorship, although it was eventually restored as Franco could hardly advocate the return to a republican regime after he himself had risen against Spain's Second Republic.
Therefore, it was General Franco who originally reinstated the current House of Bourbon. I think nobody can query King Juan Carlos' part in the transition from dictatorship to democracy, as well as his role in the final stages of the 1981 coups (his role at the start and during the coups still remains shrouded in mystery). However, this practical legitimacy has been watered down by the king's own behaviour, the ever-obscure question of his soaring personal wealth, the permanent opacity of the royal family's expenses or the outrageous cases of corruption, still pending trial.
The King's recent abdication has taken nearly everybody by surprise, but the event itself is hardly extraordinary, as it's been expected for the last two years. Now that the PSOE has become, in practice, a staunchly royalist party and no longer has "deep republican roots" -as Mr Rubalcaba said only a few days ago-, the classic republic vs monarchy dilemma has lost steam in the Spanish context. Some political forces in the left uphold the set of values and institutions that link back to the republican legitimacy of the 1930s, now combined with criticism against the obviously lacklustre Spanish democracy and opposition to the economic and social policies of the PSOE first, and the PP later, in response to the recession.
From a Catalan perspective, in principle a new King doesn't change anything in the general context. As I said earlier, the functions of the head of state in a parliamentary democracy are, fortunately, very limited. However, he is the commander in chief of the armed forces, which is a mere formality in Europe but significative in Spain, given its sad contemporary history in democratic terms. But today Spain is a member of organisations such as the EU and NATO. And, unlike in the 1970s transition to democracy, King Felipe will start his reign in the current constitutional framework. Thus, while King Juan Carlos will go down in history as the king of the democratic recovery, his son Felipe will do so as a "normal" head of state of a parliamentary democracy. At home, the main items on the political front at the time of being crowned are the management of the economic crisis and the Catalan political process.
Therefore, the so-called "third ways", if they are ever formulated, are not in the hands of the new king, but in those of the main Spanish nationalist parties (the PP and the PSOE), if anything. So far the third ways haven't shown up and nobody is expecting them. In principle, the Catalan process remains unchanged. Its centre of gravity lies with the Catalan institutions, the civil society and the citizens of Catalonia. The next stop is the referendum of November 9. That's why, in the present context, the voices supporting a "Third Spanish Republic" are alien to many Catalan ears. Not because they are republican, but because they are Spanish.
In any case, the supporters of the third ways should clarify two equally fundamental questions: the precise content of a new constitutional pact and the procedures that would guarantee that the pact would be adhered to. First of all, it should include a recognition and a degree of self-rule that were acceptable to most Catalans. This is no longer possible without devolving significant powers to do with symbols, Europe and the international sphere. Also needed would be a precise shielding of some areas (language, education, mass media, culture, welfare, etc) and the capacity to develop Catalonia's own economic and social policies, as well as a fair, stable finance system. Secondly, we would require explicit guarantees to ensure that Madrid and Spain's institutions (the executive branch, the parliament and the judiciary) would abide by this agreement. The logic of constitutional pacts like the "Statute" is now outdated and obsolete. Catalonia's collective history is too long now be misled by inexperience or naivety. Without sufficient guarantees, a "third way" pact would always be frail. And considering the previous experience, everything suggests that if the right to secede were absent from the constitutional rules, those guarantees would be rendered useless.
If both conditions were met, there may be room for a potential Spanish Commonwealth that would include the monarchy. However, I think that one would need to be very uninformed to regard that as a realistic option. Considering the precedents, the compared experiences of plurinational democracies and the empiric data of Spain's case, any rational analyst would conclude that the Catalans and their institutions will have to log off the Spanish constitutional framework at some point.
